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"SELECTIVE MINIMALISM": THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 
Alex D. Silagi 
PART 1: Introduction 
When the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court speaks, the country listens. 
That is what made John Roberts's opening comments at his confirmation hearing for the Chief 
Justice position so surprising. Of all the possible topics to discuss-abortion, gay rights, the 
death penalty, etc.-he chose baseball: "Judges are like umpires," he said, "Umpires don't make 
the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see 
the umpire."1 
The analogy, though imperfect, was clear. Roberts envisioned a Court different from the 
one that existed over the past few decades where, many felt, broad holdings with far reaching 
implications were made based more on policy decisions than on the law and facts in the record. 2 
To Roberts, the integrity of the Court, if not its constitutional mandate, required much more 
restraint. His stated goal was to usher in an era of judicial minimalism; a judicial philosophy 
that preferred narrow decisions. In his usual aphoristic way, he once said, "[i]f it is not 
necessary to decide more ... [then] it is necessary not to decide more."3 He also cared about 
how these decisions were reached. The Court was certainly not a political branch; decisions are 
based on the law and facts in the record on appeal, and never on empty policy rationales or 
results-based jurisprudence. His goals were ambitious, but he was clearly determined. 
1 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing 
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 09th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing]. 
2 For a survey of the debate over whether the Rehnquist court was minimalistic or actually more broad, see Robert 
Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Minima/ism in the Supreme Court, 
32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1045 (2009). 
3 Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, NY TIMES (May 22, 2006) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/washington/22justice.html? _r=O. 
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After almost 10 years on the bench, however, a performance evaluation is in order, and 
the results are in: he has not hewed to those stated goals. A review of Roberts's opinions 
reveals that he is engaged in something different than what he promised. It is an inconsistent 
type of minimalism, which I call "selective minimalism." That is, Roberts's adherence to a 
limited role of the courts and apolitical decisionmaking has not been a constant star in his 
constellation of decisions. Rather, the scope of his decisions, and the rationales that underlie 
them, depends on at least two determinative features: (1) whether the conduct or statute at issue 
has strong support from a unified front of concomitant branches; and (2) whether the issues 
implicate relationships between private citizens and the government, or business interests and 
the government. When the circumstances serve those interests, Roberts's minimalism is in full 
force; when they do not, his jurisprudential approach becomes less disciplined and takes on a 
results-based form that he expressly criticized in his nomination hearings. 
A comprehensive inquiry into any Justice's judicial philosophy must look beyond the 
court decisions that carry his or her name. Analysis of their decisions can be best understood by 
first looking to insight from their life. Part II will begin this inquiry by describing Roberts's 
biography. Part III will describe and analyze a representative set of his cases to help explain his 
"selective minimalism." It will cover ten cases in total-a spectrum of majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions-organized thematically by prevalent concepts: standing, crime and 
terrorism, freedom of speech, and race. Part IV will conclude by discussing interesting ways to 
think of Roberts's successes and failures according to his overarching philosophies. 
PART II: Biography 
John G. Roberts, Jr. was never mediocre. His life before the Supreme Court, from 
childhood to the D.C. Circuit bench, can be best described as a quiet, steady ascendancy to the 
2 
top of his profession. But the man who would eventually be labeled "one of the great Supreme 
Court advocates of his generation,"4 and then the youngest chief justice since John Marshall, 
was born in Buffalo in 1955 and grew up in a modest, middleclass life in Long Beach, Indiana.5 
Life around this small, Michigan Lake-side town painted the backdrop for Roberts's 
immediate success. His father's job as a steel executive with Bethlehem Steel brought in for the 
family enough money to send Roberts to the prestigious all-boys boarding school, La Lumiere, 
in nearby LaPorte. 6 He belonged there. As one teacher in his previous school reminisced, he 
was always the student through which she could measure her success. She stated, "[i]f he 
understood the concept, I was good ... If not, teach it all over again."7 At La Lumiere, things 
were no different. He was valedictorian of the class of 1973.8 He was captain of the football 
team, a varsity wrestler, and member of the student council and drama club.9 In an early 
predictor of his oral advocacy skills, he also excelled at the school's so-called declamation 
contest where he would write and memorize his own speeches. 10 He showed an extraordinary 
gift for writing. As one fellow student remembered, "[h]e could take an argument that was 
borderline absurd and argue for it so well that you were almost at the point of having to accept 
his stance even though it was intuitively obvious that it was absurd."11 
4 Adam Liptak, A Career Largely on One Side of the Bench and Involving a Wide Variety of Issues, NY TIMES 
(July 20, 2005), available at 
http://www .nytimes.com/200 5/07 /20/po litics/po liticsspeciall /20cases.html ?pagewanted=print& _r=O. 
5 JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 203 (2011); John G Roberts Fast Facts, 
CNN.COM, Mar 25,2013, available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/25/us/john-g-roberts-fast-facts/. 
6 Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul21, 2005), available 
at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07 /21 /politics/21 nominee.html?pagewanted=all. 
7 ld 
8 JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE 0BAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 8 (2012) 
9 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8. 
10 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8. 
11 Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul 21, 2005), 
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07 /21/politics/21nominee.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Roberts's superb memory and writing skills led him to Harvard College, where he 
graduated summa cum laude in 1976, after only three years. 12 During all three summers, he 
came home to the steel mill in Indiana and worked as an assistant electrician to help pay for 
school. 13 That fall, he entered Harvard Law School and worked his intellect to the same result. 
He was selected onto the Harvard Law Review, where he served as managing editor and wrote 
two published papers; one on the takings clause, 14 the other on the contract clause. 15 By all 
accounts, he was an even-tempered student who, though some students remember as having a 
conservative outlook, was never politically active or outspoken about his views. 16 He was 
simply "brilliant."17 
After graduating magna cum laude, he accepted two prestigious clerkships. In 1979, he 
took a position with Judge Henry Friend, the esteemed judge on the Second Circuit, where he is 
said to have learned from Friendly's belief in the limited role of judges.18 A year later, he 
joined then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist where, as he recalled years later, he learned to 
shift away from "fluid and wide-ranging" constitutional analysis to more solid ground focusing 
on text and precedent. 19 
When the clerkship at the Supreme Court ended, Ronald Reagan was elected president, 
and Roberts chose to join the administration.20 He began as an assistant to the attorney general, 
12 Stevens, supra note 5, at 204. 
13 Stevens, supra note 5, at 204. 
14 John G. Roberts, Jr., Developments in the Law-Zoning, The Takings Clause, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1462 (1978). 
15 Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul 21, 2005), 
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07 /21 /politics/21 nominee.html?pagewanted=all; 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Comment, Contract Clause-Legislative Alteration of Private Pension Agreements: Allied 
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 92 HARV. L. REv. 86 (1978). 
16 Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul 21, 2005), 
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07 /21 /politics/21 nominee.html?pagewanted=all. 
17 !d. 
18 !d.; Stevens, supra note 5, at 204. 
19 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 38-39. 
20 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 39. 
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then moved to the White House counsel's office.21 While he was far from the highest ranking 
in the office, he demonstrated value though his clear and effortless writing style that he would 
use with characteristic force throughout his career. For example, when a congressman proposed 
a conference to discuss power sharing among the branches, Roberts retorted to his superiors, 
"[t]here already has, of course, been a 'Conference on Power Sharing.' It took place in 
Philadelphia's Constitution Hall in 1787, and someone should tell [the Congressman] about it 
and the 'report' it issued."22 Similarly, when Chief Justice Burger pushed for an additional 
appellate court to lighten the Supreme Court's case load, Roberts cheekily said, "[ w ]hile some of 
the tales of woe emanating from the Court are enough to bring tears to the eyes, it is true that 
only Supreme Court justices and schoolchildren are expected to and do take the entire summer 
off."23 
When his tenure with the administration ended in 1986, he briefly joined the prominent 
former D.C. law firm Hogan & Hartson but was immediately called back to the executive 
branch as a deputy at the solicitor general's office.24 Between his time there and his return to 
private practice, Roberts argued an astounding thirty-nine cases and established himself as one 
of the favorites among the justices?5 His successes did not go unnoticed when, in 2003, 
President Bush nominated Roberts to a judgeship on the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, which many regard as a pipeline for potential Supreme Court nomination.26 
He was confirmed by a unanimous senate?7 Then, after only a short two years on the bench, 
the president elevated Roberts again, this time to replace Justice O'Connor, who was retiring 
21 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 39. 
22 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40. 
23 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40. 
24 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40. 
25 Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40-41. 
26 Todd S. Purdum, In Pursuit of Conservative Stamp, President Nominates Roberts, NY TIMES (July 20, 2005), 
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07 /20/politics/po liticsspeciall /20nominee.htm l?pagewanted=all. 
27 !d. 
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from the Court?8 But after an ailing Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away just a week after, 
Bush announced that Roberts would instead be nominated to take the seat of his former 
mentor.29 
At the confirmation hearings before the Judiciary Committee, Roberts shined. As he 
had always done for oral arguments, he sat before the row of Senators with no papers, and 
answered their questions with an easy erudition showed why he is one of the best advocates of 
his time. Reflecting on Roberts's ability to quote the Federalist papers by memory and 
summarize a wide body of case law, one Senator remarked that Roberts "retired the trophy" for 
judicial nominees. 30 Most Senators agreed. Roberts championed values that most though 
admirable and reasonably attainable: he described his desire for more unanimous decisions, a 
narrow role for courts (reflected notably in his umpire analogy), and the importance of 
adherence to precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis. 31 He was confirmed on September 22, 
2005 by the Judiciary Committee's vote of 13-5, and by the full Senate by 78-22.32 
As with the addition of any new justice to the Court, the dynamics of the nine changed 
when Roberts joined. But his role as Chief Justice affected changes that extended beyond 
adding a new personality, judicial philosophy, or strategies as would occur if an associate 
justice were replaced. Roberts has assumed responsibilities unique to the Chief Justice and he 
made alterations in ways that bespeak his personality. Certain obligations of a Chief Justice are 
constant: administering the oath of office to the president, presiding over the justices' private 
certiorari or voting conferences and open court proceedings, and assigning a justice to author an 
28 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 323 (2007). 
29 Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 327. 
30 Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 327. 
31 Roberts Confirmation Hearing, at 55, 141-42, 424. 
32 Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 327. 
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opinion (when the Chief sides with the majority).33 Where the Chief Justice is given discretion, 
however, Roberts parted ways with tradition. Whereas his predecessor, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, wore a robe with four gold stripes on each sleeve, Roberts did away with such 
ostentation and decided to revert back to wearing the same all-black robe as the other justices.34 
That the decision stemmed from the seeds of a unpretentious life is unmistakable. Likewise, he 
increased the length of private conferences to allow for more discussion of a case's merits and 
reasoning to consider a grant. 35 He is also more forgiving with time at oral argument where, 
contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist' s strict practice of silencing advocates the moment the red 
light flashed, Roberts will allow a few comments after time.36 
In essence, John Roberts is not William Rehnquist; neither in the sense of procedural 
adherence or jurisprudential attitude. But neither is the image Roberts projects to the world-
that of a modest man who wants to get things right while staying out of limelight-a reflection 
of his judicial philosophy. To best answer what his philosophy is, one must turn to his opinions. 
PART III: Case Studies. 
A. Guarding the Courthouse Doors: An Inquiry into Standing. 
From his school days in Massachusetts to his days in New York clerking for Judge 
Friendly and finally to his life in Washington D.C., John Roberts must have spent countless 
hours and miles on the highways that connect those cities. He would have joined the millions of 
commuters that travel these roads, their cars and busses spitting noxious gases into the 
atmosphere. Though one might think this environmental issue troubled the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the agency during the George W. Bush administration took no action 
33 Stevens, supra note 5, at 44. 
34 See Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 142; Stevens, supra note 5, at 208. 
35 Stevens, supra note 5, at 210. 
36 Stevens, supra note 5, at 172, 201. 
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to redress it. From this inaction, the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA was 
bome.37 
In the early 2000s, a collection of States, local governments, and private 
organizations alleged that the EPA has abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to 
regulate the emissions of several greenhouse gases.38 They argued that the previous decade 
registered some of the warmest months ever recorded on the planet, that international climate 
change research bodies have concluded that greenhouse gasses were causing this climate 
change, and the warming posed a threat to people and property if left unchecked. 39 In rejecting 
their petitions to act, the EPA reasoned that the Clear Air Act did not give it authorization to 
issue mandatory regulations to address global climate change, and even if it could, it would not 
because the parties could not show an unequivocal causal link between green house gas 
emissions and the increase in global temperature. 4° Further, the EPA characterized any 
potential action as contrary to the President's "comprehensive approach" to the problem, which 
included nonregulatory program action, voluntary private sector reductions in green house 
emissions, and more exhaustive research before instituting new regulations.41 
The antecedent issue to these questions, and a critical aspect of the Court's decision, was 
the EPA's argument that none of the parties had standing to bring suit because the alleged 
harm-the effects of greenhouse emissions-are widespread and therefore too general a 
problem to satisfy Article III's "case and controversy requirement."42 The Court, in a 5-4 split 
37 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
38 Jd. at 505. Massachusetts was one of the states that intervened in the litigation after the private organizations had 
~etitioned the EPA to act, asserting its injury as the loss of land due to sea level rise. !d. 
9 !d. at 510. 
40 !d. at 511. 
41 !d. at 513 . 
42 !d. at 517. As the Court explains, the standing doctrine generally has three constitutional requirements that all 
litigants must meet in order for their claim to be justiciable in federal court: (1) an actual, concrete injury in fact; 
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along ideological lines, held that of all the litigants, at least Massachusetts had standing to sue.43 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that standing was satisfied even though the 
regulation's ability to affect change was not entirely certain because "it by no means follows 
that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. "44 
He added, "Because of the enormity of the potential consequences associated with manmade 
climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the 
(relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially 
irrelevant.',45 Lastly, unlike private citizen suits, Massachusetts is treated differently because 
states have a special claim to standing in the federal courts to protect their "quasi-sovereign" 
interests in "all the earth and air within [their] domain[s].',46 
The Chief Justice, writing for a four-j:ustice dissent, disagreed with what he felt was the 
majority's expansive reading of the standing requirements. First, in his typical reader-friendly 
way, Roberts wrote that, before determining whether the plaintiffs have standing, "the Court 
changes the rules" by asserting that states are not normallitigants.47 This conclusion, he argues, 
has no basis in the Court's jurisprudence and is absent from the general judicial review 
provisions of the Clear Air Act. He observed that the majority's resurrection of 100 year old 
precedent to support the contention is telling evidence that the relaxed-standing argument 
needed all the help it could get. 48 
(2) causation; and (3) redressability. See id. at 521-526. For the "case and controversy" language, see U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. 
43 ld. at 526. 
44ld. 
45 ld 
46 Jd. at 519 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). 
47 Jd. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
48 ld. at 536, 540 (stating that the citation is "an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on 
traditional terms"); Richard Murphy, Abandoning Constitutional Standing: Trading A Rule of Access for A Rule of 
Deference, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS at *16 (Spring 2009) (commenting on majority's decision to rely on such 
outdated precedent). 
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The heart of Robert's dissent, though, attacked the majority's approach to standing's 
"redressability" requirement-i.e., the likelihood, beyond mere speculation, that a decision in 
the plaintiffs favor will redress the injury. He wrote, 
[ e ]ven if the regulation does reduce emissions . . . the Court never 
explains why that makes it likely that the injury in fact-the loss of 
land-will be redressed. Schoolchildren know that a kingdom might be 
lost "all for the want of a horseshoe nail," but "likely" redressability is a 
different matter. The realities make it pure conjecture to suppose that 
EPA regulation of new automobile emissions will likely prevent the loss 
of Massachusetts coastalland.49 
The majority's relaxed standing requirement, at its core, allows litigants to use the courts as 
forums for policy debates, rather than for deciding concrete issues.50 The standing doctrine's 
limitation on which issues the courts can hear, according to Roberts, "is crucial in maintaining 
the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution. In [his] view, the Court ... fails 
to take this limitation seriously."51 
Roberts's dissent reveals a critical aspec1 of his judicial philosophy: the role of the 
courts must be a limited one given the narrow standing requirements that the framers put forth 
in Article III's "case and controversy" language. Since the doctrine must be considered in any 
suit brought in federal court, Roberts's aggressive take on sorting who can and cannot sue 
facilitates his minimalist approach to judging. The fewer litigants that have standing, the fewer 
decisions the Court will have to address. 
Of course, the counter argument adopted by the majority suggests that this narrow 
approach imposes an unjustified and unprincipled limit on the availability of the federal 
forum. 52 The fundamental fork in the road between the two positions, though, is whether the 
49 I d. at 546 (emphasis in original). 
50 Jd. at 547. 
51 Jd. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
52 ERWIN CHIMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 79 {4th ed. 2011). 
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concept of "forum availability" is, in fact, a good thing. For example, a necessary byproduct of 
fewer litigants is that the would-be plaintiffs would have to tum to other avenues to redress their 
problems-namely the political and executive forums. This separation of powers concept-this 
"tripartite allocation of power"-reinforces that notion. Roberts thus puts his faith in the idea 
that the concomitant branches can and will redress people's problems and, if not, the people will 
see to it that new legislators and executives are elected. Were this basic assumption untrue, 
Roberts suggests, the federal courts would necessarily be superior to the coordinate branches. 
Given that the separation of powers is premised on horizontal parity, his dissent shows an 
unwillingness to accept that proposition. 
Behind the academic battle of constitutional norms, however, lies the practical 
implications of Roberts's restrictive view on standing. Roberts, unlike most of the other 
justices, came to the Court after successful private practice where he represented mostly large 
corporations or entities against individual plaintiffs. 53 Given that the basic strategy for defense 
counsel is to dispose of cases as early in litigation as possible, procedural mechanisms like 
standing would have been valuable weapons. One can easily imagine how years of arguing for 
narrowed standing requirements and benefiting from procedurals roadblocks helped shape 
Robert's judicial philosophy in this area. Indeed, his largely pro-business voting positions after 
he joined the Court stay true to this viewpoint. 54 Ultimately, Roberts activates his minimalisms 
in the standing context and acts as a careful sentinel of the courthouse doors. 
53 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) where Roberts argued, and the Court agreed, that 
a Toyota employee diagnosed with carpel tunnel syndrome could not recover damages from Toyota under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act; see also Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1997) where Roberts 
successfully defended a wrongful death claim against the city brought by the family of a woman who died in a fire. 
54 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (ban on corporations and unions using treasury funds for 
independent campaign spending violates First Amendment); Wal-Mart v. Duke, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (class 
action against Wal-Mart for discrimination failed because class did not have requisite common questions of law or 
fact); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011) (Arizona employer ID law not preemp\byl\federal 
immigration law). ~ 
11 
B. Crime, Terrorism, and Habeas Jurisdiction. 
If access to the federal courthouse is important to Roberts in the traditional civil context, 
the issue (and his vehemence) is magnified in the context of military detentions. Such was the 
case when the Court decided the Guantanamo Bay detainee case Boumediene v. Bush in June 
2008.55 This blockbuster terrorism detention case completed what was a long slog through the 
federal courts in the years proceeding the attacks on September 11, 2001.56 The culmination of 
those previous cases-all of which acknowledged certain rights of enemy combatants-was 
Congress's codification of two statutes: the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA),57 which stripped all 
federal courts of jurisdiction (except the United State Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia) to hear writs of habeas corpus by noncitizen enemy combatants held in Guantanamo 
Bay; and the Military Commission Act (MCA), 58 which holds the same but applies it 
retroactively to cover all noncitizen detainees. 
Boumediene v. Bush represented the last chapter in a series of setbacks to the Bush 
Administration and Congress in the terrorism/detention context. In a 5-4 decision, Justice 
Kennedy wrote that the plaintiffs-six Algerian detainees held in Guantanamo Bay--could not 
be prevented from filing habeas petitions in federal court because the DTA and MCA's 
preclusion of jurisdiction was unconstitutiona1.59 The majority held that the Constitution's 
Suspension Clause60 is an affirmative right that reaches, and has full effect on, the detainees 
55 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
56 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that American citizen captured in foreign country 
and held as an enemy combatant must be accorded due process); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 723 (2004) (holding that 
Guantanamo detainees can have habeas petitions filed heard in federal court). 
57 Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
58 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006) 
59 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
60 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.") 
12 
held extraterritorially in Guantanamo.61 Moreover, the remedies provided to the detainees 
through the DTA and MCA, including the D.C. Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction and deferential 
review of "enemy combatant" designations, were not adequate substitutes for the right. 62 The 
Court thus stymied what it believed was Congress's attempt to impermissibly circumscribe 
habeas review in ways that had full presidential support. 
Roberts, writing a dissent joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, upbraided the 
majority for what he perceived as blatant judicial overstepping. He began the opinion by 
bluntly stating, "[t]oday the Court strikes down as inadequate the most generous set of 
procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy combatants. "63 
To Roberts, the decision should have been about context. "The political branches," he wrote, 
"crafted these procedures amidst an 9ngoing military conflict, after much careful investigation 
and thorough debate."64 Nonetheless, he continues, 
[t]he Court rejects them today out of hand, without bothering to 
say what due process rights the detainees possess, without 
explaining how the statute fails to vindicate those rights, and 
before a single petitioner has exhausted the procedures under the 
law. And to what effect? The majority merely replaces a review 
system designed by the people's representatives with a set of 
shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future 
date.65 
Such a result is not a win for the detainees, as Roberts writes, but rather leaves them with the 
prospect of more litigation down the road that forces the unsuited district courts to make 
61 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
62 !d. at 799. 




decisions-e.g., what to do with classified information about terrorist detainees-that have 
national security implications. 66 
The crux of Roberts' dissent turns on his position about the appropriate role of the 
judiciary in the military context. Though the stakes may be different than the EPA standing 
cases, the underlying philosophy bleeds through. Whereas the Boumediene majority focuses on 
what it believes to be "a profound reaffirmation of the rule of law," Roberts sees an unraveling 
of the rule of law by an officious institution. 67 As he writes at the outset of his dissent, "[ o ]ne 
cannot help but think, after surveying the modest practical results of the majority's ambitious 
opinion, that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but about control of federal 
policy regarding enemy combatants. "68 To Roberts, such policies derive from a realm that the 
President and Congress alone have dominion. And the decision to undermine their 
determinations is even more disconcerting to him given the consensus among both of those 
branches about an appropriate course of conduct to deal with this unique challenge. Were there 
ever a time to take a reserved approach to overruling congressional legislation, the antiterrorism 
statutes were prime candidates; as such, Roberts's dissent epitomizes his arguments about the 
need for judicial minimalism. 
His minimalism also shines through in the criminal law context, where he has shown a 
proclivity towards decisions that require case-by-case examinations rather than sweeping 
propositions about how criminal law should work. His separate writing in Graham v. Florida 
epitomizes this.69 In 2010, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in this case, which held 
66 Jd. at 826. Here, Roberts's strong yet controlled passion is evident. He is more reserved in expressing the same 
sentiment as Justice Scalia, who sharply predicts that the Court's decision "will almost certainly cause more 
Americans to be killed," adding hyperbolically that "[t]he Nation will live to regret what the Court has done 
today." /d. at 828, 850 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
67 See Chimerinsky, supra note 52, at 390. 
68 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
69 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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that imposing a life sentence without the possibility of parole on juvenile offender for a non-
homicide crime violates thG Amendment. 70 In so holding, the Court announced a 
categorical rule applicable to every juvenile that commits a non-homicide offence.71 
Roberts, concurring in the judgment, disagreed that the Court had to "invent a new 
constitutional rule of dubious provenance" to reach its conclusion.72 Rather, he would have 
held that that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to take the offender's age into 
consideration as part of a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry, weighing it against the 
seriousness of the crime?3 The rationale, Roberts indicated, was twofold. First, the context of 
criminal sentences calls for a person-specific inquiry into whether the person can eventually be 
fit to rejoin society. The jury and the judge are fit to make these determinations on the ground, 
and the Court should not undermine or underemphasize their ability to do so. Second, the 
Court's Eighth Amendment precedent answers the question narrowly, without requiring broad 
rules. 74 Specifically, he wrote, the Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons drew a1 categorical 
line at whether a juvenile could be subject to capital punishment, but its holding did not reach 
these types of decisions; instead Roper is valuable for what it did explicitly say, that juveniles 
are typically less blameworthy than adults and therefore it should be a major, but not 
dispositive, factor. 75 
Roberts's concurrence in Graham shows a dedication to narrow decisionmaking in the 
criminal context that shares qualities similar to his Boumediene dissent. The Boumediene 
decision exemplifies how Roberts employs a minimalist approach when the majority acts 
70 /d. at 82. 
71 /d. at 75. 
72 /d. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
73 /d. 
74 ld. at 90. 
75 /d. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). 
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contrary to the wishes of the two other branches of government. Those branches, according to 
Roberts, are best fit to make determinations about its own treatment of individuals who pose 
threats to the nation. The courts should stay away. However, Graham involved a decision by 
\ ' c ::A 
v'f 
certain states to allow life without parole for juveniles, but nowher~he issue implicate the kind 
of unified front of branches to which Roberts would feel compelled to defer. Instead, he 
employs a true minimalistic approach by making a decision that is narrow, case-by-case, and 
shows deference to precedent. 
----C. First Amendment Protections. 
While Roberts was on the losing end of the combatant detention cases, he was 
eventually able to draft a majority opinion in a case with overt national security implications; 
although, this time, in the surprising context of First Amendment jurisprudence. In Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, Roberts wrote for 5 other justices, holding that a federal law 
prohibiting material support of terrorist-designated foreign organizations did not violate the 
First Amendment as applied to groups seeking to teach and advocate peaceful resolution of 
conflicts to such organizations.76 
Based on its finding that certain organizations "are so tainted by their criminal conduct 
that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct," Congress adopted a law 
prohibiting the provision of "material support or resources" to certain foreign organizations that 
engage in terrorist activity. 77 Its definition of "material support" covers a wide range of 
activities, some of which clearly relate to illegal conduct and others that seem more 
innocuous. 78 Moreover, the Secretary of State has the authority to determine which 
76 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010). 
77 ld. at 2712-13 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). 
78 Currently, "material support" means "any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
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organizations qualify as foreign terrorist organizations. 79 Foil owing passage of the so-called 
"material support" statute, several U.S. citizens and domestic organizations that intended to 
provide support for the political and humanitarian activities of two organizations labeled as 
"foreign terrorists" brought suit. 80 They sued on the theory that, among other things, the 
criminal prohibition on providing support to those organizations violate their free speech rights 
as a ban on political speech.81 
The Court, lead by Roberts, rejected their arguments and held that such speech could be 
constitutionally restricted so long as it was done in connection with a designed foreign terrorist 
organization. 82 The majority so held in part because it believed the statute did not reach most 
forms of expression. Roberts stated that, under the statute, "plaintiffs may say anything they 
wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about [foreign terrorist organizations], the 
governments of [the countries to which these organizations belong], human rights, and 
international law. They may advocate before the United Nations."83 It is only the unique 
circumstance of "coordination [directly] with foreign groups" that the statute prohibits. 84 
The bottom line for Roberts is that, even if certain lawful speech with no imminent 
threat is reached, the restriction is permissible given the congressional and executive support for 
the statute. He wrote: "Congress made specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by 
international terrorism," adding that the majority was relying upon "affidavits stating the 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except 
medicine or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4). 
79 Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2713 (internal citation omitted). 
80 Jd. at 2713-14. 
81 /d. at 2722-23. The plaintiffs raised two other constitutional claims that the majority also disposed of. First, they 
claimed that the "material support" statutes violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because ;vere 
statutory terms are impermissibly vague. Second, they claimed that the statute also violated their First Amendment 
freedom of association. ld. at 2716. 
82 /d. at 2722-23, 2725. 
83 Jd at 2722-23. 
84 I d. at 2723. 
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Executive Branch's conclusion [that] ... 'the experience and analysis of the U.S. government 
agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly support' Congress's finding that all 
contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism. "85 In words that could 
have been taken exactly from his Boumediene dissent, Roberts continues, "[t]hat evaluation of 
the facts by the Executive, like Congress's assessment, is entitled to deference. This litigation 
implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs. "86 Lastly, in a 
clear attempt to show that his rationale should not be confined to First Amendment contexts, he 
use~Jthe Boumediene majority's own words against itself by stating, "[w]e have noted that 
'neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefmgs that 
may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people."'87 To Roberts, his 
deferential judicial philosophy regarding national security and terrorism was fmally good law, 
and he wanted to make sure it would not be caged in. 
A troubling aspect of Robert's Humanitarian Law Project decision is its relationship to 
past First Amendment jurisprudence. Although he does not address it in his opinion, this case 
is the first time the Court ruled that speech advocating only lawful, nonviolent activity can be 
criminally punished, even where the speakers' intent is to discourage violence. As Breyer 
argues in dissent, "coordination" is not punishable, especially given the longstanding principle 
from Brandenburg v. Ohio that the First Amendment "protects advocacy even of unlawful 
action so long as that advocacy is not 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and ... likely to incite or produce such action."' 88 Here, the plaintiffs' conduct is lawful, and 
not imminent. Yet, Roberts does not address, or even cite to, this bedrock principle. Moreover, 
85 Jd. at 2724, 2727 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
86 I d. at 2727. 
87 Jd. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)). 




he eschews any label of scrutiny, though he acknowledges that intermediate and strict could 
have been applicable. 89 Instead, Roberts rejects intermediate scrutiny, and applies a more 
"rigorous" test, but never expressly adopts the strict scrutiny language. 
Th~ end result shows Roberts engaging in a type of legal gerrymandering to reach a 
certain result without confining himself to an analytical framework. There is little doubt that, 
had Roberts accepted strict scrutiny outright (as the circumstances persuasively called for it), he 
would have placed the government in an uphill battle to defend any future challenges to this 
statute or similar national security laws. And, in doing so, his opaque reasoning leaves 
unanswered important questions about the state of the Brandenburg doctrine. For example, his 
decision could arguabf~ support congressional legislation prohibiting any individual from 
lending support to the nonviolent activity of gang members (e.g., youth men to ring programs), 
given that those organizations pose serious threats and their apprehension is in the hands of the 
executive branch. These are the types of questions that a true minimalist would not have 
implicated when the decision did not require it. 
That is not to say, however, that Roberts is unreceptive to free speech infringements. As 
his majority opinion in Snyder v. Phelps a year later indicates, he has a keen sense of the values 
of free speech when national security implications are not at stake.90 In this emotionally-
charged case, the Court refused to uphold punishment of Westboro Baptist Church, an extremist 
religious group that protests at the funerals of military service members by waving hate signs. 91 
While serving in Iraq, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in the line of 
duty.92 His father chose the family's local Catholic Church in Maryland to hold the funeral. 93 
89 ld. at 2723 (noting parties' respective arguments to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny). 
90 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011) 
91 MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 324-25 (2013). 
92 Snyder, 131 S.Ct. at 1213. 
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The members of Westboro Baptist Church learned about the funeral and, as they typically do, 
picketed a short distance away from the Church gates holding signs that included such phrases 
as "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11 ," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," 
"Priests Rape Boys," "God Hates Fags," and "God Hates You."94 Snyder's father sued the 
picketers for intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion. 95 
In an 8-1 decision, with Justice Alito as the lone dissenter, Justice Roberts wrote that 
liability could not be imposed on the Church, even for engaging in such vicious speech. 96 
"Given that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern," he wrote, 
"that speech is entitled to 'special protection' under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot 
be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt."97 This conclusion was only 
possible because Roberts, with almost unanimous support, outlined a broad understanding of 
what constituted speech on a matter of public concern. Westboro's picket signs were a matter 
of public concern because "the issues they highlight-the political and moral conduct of the 
United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals 
involving the Catholic clergy-are matters of public import."98 Given that the state has 
alternatives to protect funeral-goers' privacy, like creating buffer zones, "we cannot react to that 
pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even 
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate."99 
It seems hard to reconcile Roberts's decisions in Snyder and Holder. He would prohibit 
those who want to engage in peaceful coordination with organizations to inculcate lawful 
93 ld. 
94 ld. 
95 ld. at 1214. 
96 ld. at 1219-20. 
97 I d. at 121 9. 
98 ld. at 1217. 
99 ld. at 1218, 1220. 
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political values, while protecting the rights of religious extremists who intentionally batter 
families during emotionally fraught times. The critical difference is that, in Holder, Roberts's 
decision was supported by the a unified front of the coordinate governmental branches. Indeed, 
in Holder, Roberts rejected arguments that lawful material support would help, not harm, 
Congress's initiative because of his excessive deference to Congress's ability to make those 
types of determinations on its own. Given that Roberts's Snyder opinion extracts valuable 
political discourse from such hateful comments that are at best peripherally related public 
debate, there is no other reason to treat differently the plainly political discourse that falls under 
"material support." 
Another important difference between the two cases is that Snyder involved a private 
litigant's suit against another private citizen. But Roberts does not show the same openness to 
the protection of speech when a private citizen sues the government, even where the 
government is regulating speech in its capacity as a quasi-private actor. 
When the government regulates speech in its capacity as an educator, Roberts reverts to 
a deference akin to Holder. In Morse v. Frederick, a student arrived late to school and joined 
his classmates watching the Olympic torch procession pass by. 100 While he waited, he unfurled 
a large banner that read "Bong Hits 4 Jesus."101 The school principal asked the student to 
remove the banner, believing that it encouraged illegal drug use, and suspended the student 
when he refused to comply. 102 The student challenged his punishment on free speech grounds. 
In an opinion by Roberts, the five-justice majority held that school officials may punish 
speech that appears to advocate illegal drug use and, thus, the suspension was permissible.103 
100 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
101 I d. at 397. 
102 ld. at 398. 
103 Jd. at 410. 
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The Court stated that that those who viewed the banner would understand it to be advocating 
and promoting illegal drug use. 104 In its view, the words on the banner could be taken as an 
invitation to smoke marijuana or as a celebration of drug use. 105 Puzzlingly though, whereas 
"Westboro's signs plainly relates to public ... matters,"106 here, Roberts stated that the words 
bear no political or religious meaning-that is, "this is plainly not a case about political debate 
over the criminalization of drug use or possession."107 Accordingly, the protections afforded to 
the banner's expressions were limited. 
But this limitation notwithstanding, the banner did not fall cleanly into any of the 
Court's carve outs from First Amendment protection in the school speech context. As Roberts 
recognizes, up to that point, the Court had generally recognized three circumstances where the 
school can prohibit student speech: first, where speech causes a material disruption; 108 second, 
where speech is lewd and lacks a political message; 109 and third, where speech is school 
sponsored. 110 Here, the student's banner does not fit well into any one. Faced with two 
options-either adhere to the doctrine, reversing the punishment that does not fall under any 
exception, or create a new judge-made carve out-Roberts chose to reshape the doctrine by 
creating a fourth exception for speech that advocates illegal drug use. This plainly was an act of 
policy-based decisionmaking. 
The reason why Roberts would engage In such an awkward twisting of precedent 
becomes more clear when he explains what drives the school-drug issue. He writes, "Congress 
has declared that part of a school's job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug 
104 Jd. at 401-402. 
105 !d. at 403. 
106 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1212 (2011). 
107 !d. at 403. 
108 See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
109 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
110 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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use. It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local drug-prevention programs."111 
Pursuant to those ends, "[t]housands of school boards throughout the country ... have adopted 
policies aimed at effectuating this message. "112 
Robert's own history likely worked the tipping point in the decision. A student of 
unmatched capabilities throughout his educational life, he always kept his schooling at the front 
of his thoughts. As a high school student at La Lumiere School, he was inculcated with the 
values of academic excellence upon which the institution was built. 113 The traditional 
curriculum he received there mixed with his punctilious view of schooling were worlds apart 
from the types of students who would unfurl "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banners merely to gain 
attention. 114 Even at Harvard undergraduate and law school, Roberts arrived there when the 
Cambridge campus was no longer the radicalized bastion of liberalism that it had been in the 
late '60s, where the campus would have been littered with protests and banners, and he left 
before the campus was deeply divided over legal studies in the '80s. 115 The totality of this 
educational upbringing placed Roberts firmly in support of laws that preserve discipline and 
order within the schools; and therefore, his deferential approach to the government as educator 
is unsurprising. 
But Roberts's lack of restraint in Morse cuts against the commitments he made at his 
senate hearing, and he casts even more doubt in the Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Committee decision. 116 The Court notoriously overruled its previous precedent and struck down 
111 Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. 
112Jd. 
113 See Toobin, The Oath, supra note 5, at 8. 
114 See Toobin, The Oath, supra note 5, at 8. 
115 Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Is Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY TIMES (July 21, 2005), 
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07 /21/politics/21 nominee.html?pagewanted=all& _r=O; Too bin, The 
Oath, supra note 5, at 25. 
116 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
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part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's restrictions on independent expenditures by 
corporations to get candidates elected or defeated. 117 
In the decades leading up to the decision, the Court had made several key 
pronouncements about corporate political speech: first, corporations possess free speech 
rights; 118 second, expenditures in election campaigns are core political speech;119 and third, 
corporations can spend money in election campaigns, but the money must be raised in a 
separate account from its corporate fund. 120 The third pronouncement, which the Court decided 
l 
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce in 1990, was the focus fn Justice Kennedy's 
majority decision in Citizens United. In expressly overruling Austin, Kennedy wrote, "[ n ]o case 
before Austin has held that Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political 
speech based on the speaker's corporate identity," adding, "[p]olitical speech is indispensible to 
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a 
corporation rather than an individual."121 Accordingly, the rationale behind Austin was rejected 
and the provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act modeled after it was held 
unconstitutional. 
Roberts's concurrence is notable for his characterization of the majority's break from its 
previous precedence. His opinion is largely devoted to "important principles of judicial 
restraint and stare decisis implicated in this case. "122 Although neither party required Austin to 
117 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
118 See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) ("The inherent worth of the speech 
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual."). 
119 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (stating that "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or 
group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached"). 
120 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (reasoning that the regulation 
"ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by the corporation"). 
121 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
122 Jd. at 373 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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be overruled in order to decide the case, the majority nonetheless took a more aggressive 
approach that reached its earlier decision. 123 Roberts felt that----contrary to his principles of 
restraint-this aggressiveness was warranted because "we cannot embrace a narrow ground of 
decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right."124 But it is far from clear that the 
only difference between reaching or avoiding the constitutional issue is a matter of judicial 
accuracy. For one, the Court had upheld the same provision just 7 years earlier in McCone II v. 
Federal Election Commission; 125 a critical difference over those years is not a major shift in the 
campaign financing world, but rather Justice Alita replaced a retiring Justice O'Connor (a 
majority vote in McConnell). Moreover, in his own 2007 majority opinion, Federal Election 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Roberts refused to overrule the provision, as well. 126 If 
Wisconsin Right to Life was wrong, then he should have declared it so then; if the decision was 
right then, nothing materially changed since to suddenly render Citizens United correct. On the 
other hand, if Roberts was merely using Wisconsin Right to Life as a way to limit precedent 
before he jettisoned it outright-in that case he defmed the types of ads that would fall under 
the regulation so broadly as to render the definition virtually meaningless-then he was merely 
making a disingenuous distinction that Scalia accused of being "faux judicial restraint."127 
These types of inconsistent decisions go directly against the grain of Roberts's stated 
goals to ensure steady, predictable decisionmaking. That is not to say that justices can never 
change their minds-indeed, sometimes new approaches result in better decisions. But what it 
does suggest is that those fundamental aspects of precedence, like settled expectations, 
predictability, and unworkability, are ignored when the Court moves so radically back and forth 
123 Coyle, supra note 91, at 224. 
124 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 375 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
125 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
126 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
127 Jd. at 498 n7 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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over a mere course of years, and threatens the integrity of the Court. The deleterious effects 
will soon be felt. Take, for example, the Court's upcoming decision in McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission, regarding whether the court will strike down aggregate contribution 
limitations. The result in Citizens United strongly suggest that the same majority will render the 
limitation unconstitutional. Such a result may be right, but that is not the point. Rather, the 
point is that the integrity of the institution will be harmed because the constant vacillations over 
the past few years, and over the past few decisions, will inevitably give the appearance that the 
Court is making a political decision. Roberts's decisions will have facilitated that result. 
D. Decisions with Overt Racial Implications: 
Roberts's decision in the First Amendment context are problematic for their lack of 
consistent minimalism. In the context of racial issues, however, Roberts's jurisprudential 
approach takes on a rogue form, entirely devoid of the intended markers for his tenure. 
Specifically, his decisions involving race and discrimination have been reached without the 
slightest concern for consensus, minimalism, or adherence to stare decisis. 
Roberts wrote the majority opinions in two pivotal 5-4 decisions (with numerous 
concurrences and dissents) that had overt racial implications. In Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, Roberts wrote for the majority that struck 
down a school district's consideration of race in assigning students to public schools in order to 
increase racial integration. 128 In the context of voting rights, he wrote the majority opinion in 
Shelby County v. Holder, where the Court struck down § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
which identified states with histories of race-based voter suppression that have to get approval 
from federal authorities before making changes to their voting procedures. 129 
128 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
129 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(b). 
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In Parents Involved, several school districts adopted plans to include race as a one of 
many factors when deciding which students would be assigned to certain schools. In addition to 
other factors including family members and neighbors attending the school, the school 
considered whether the student applicants would help it achieve greater racial diversity. Some 
of the school systems voluntarily imposed the plans after judicial desegregation orders were 
lifted; others imposed the plans without any history of discrimination. 
Roberts, writing for a four-justice plurality, found that the school districts failed strict 
scrutiny because diversity in primary and secondary school classrooms was not a compelling 
governmental interest. 130 He stated, "[t]o the extent the objective is sufficient diversity so that 
students see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a racial group, using 
means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is fundamentally at cross-purposes 
with that end."131 In his view, racial balancing is unequivocally an unconstitutional end, not a 
question of verbiage. 
Roberts's position 1s derived from his misguided vtews about the importance of 
diversity, the pernicious effects of racism, and twisting of the Court's precedence. Regardless 
of the school boards' opinions on the matter (a complete about-face from his deference to local 
school policy-makers in the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" case), Roberts's believed that the Court had 
already decided this issue in Brown v. Board of Education: 
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and 
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school 
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that we should allow this once again-even for very 
different reasons ... [T]he way "to achieve a system of determining 
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis," is to stop 
assigning students on a racial basis. 132 
130 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730-33. 
131 ld. at 733. 
132 ld. at 747-48. 
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In his epigrammatic way, he concluded, "[T]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis ofrace."133 
The dissent was outraged. Rightfully so. Roberts's reliance on Brown was a "cruel 
irony," as Justice Stevens wrote. 134 Roberts had taken the promises guaranteed by the Equal 
Protection clause and upended them, conflating the idea of racial segregation with racial 
integration. This distortion of precedent ignores the context behind the desegregation cases and 
the march toward civil rights, turning the concept of racial equality into a game of mere 
wordsmithing. Moreover, Roberts's "colorblind" approach to the constitution implicated the 
Court's other racial diversity cases, including Gruffer v. Bollinger. 135 Justice Stevens pointedly 
noted that "[t]he Court has changed significantly ... It was then more faithful to Brown and 
more respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member of 
the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today' s decision."136 Justice Breyer, 
reading aloud from the bench the day the Court announced its opinion, asked, "[ w ]hat about 
stare decisis ... ? [W]hat of the hope and promise ofBrown?"137 Then, in a line Breyer did not 
include in his written opinion, he added, "It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly 
changed so much."138 The comment struck Justice Alito, who stared across the room at Breyer, 
but Roberts stayed expressionless, his teeth visible clenched.139 
133 !d. at 748. 
134 Jd. at 799 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
135 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action policy in University of Michigan Law School). 
136 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
137 Opinion Announcement, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, available at 
http://www .oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006 _ 05 _908. 
138 !d.; Toobin, The Nina, supra note 28 at 390. 
139 Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28; Coyle, supra note 91, at 112. 
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Civil right groups shared Breyer's outrage but not his surprise at the decision because 
they closely tracked Roberts's position on racial issues during his nomination. 140 They were 
likewise not surprised by his aversion to the Voting Rights Act. During his younger years in the 
Reagan Administration, he was a strong voice in the internal debate over Congress's plans for 
the Act. 141 Roberts cautioned in one memo among many that looser standards would "provide a 
basis for the most intrusive interference imaginable by federal courts into state and local 
processes."142 Twenty years later, however, when he was questioned about the memo during 
his confrrmation hearings, he maintained that he was merely advising his client and ensured that 
he would have an open mind. 143 
Not so. When Roberts penned the majority decision in Shelby County v. Holder in 2012, 
he engaged in one of his most outwards shows of judicial reaching since he became Chief 
Justice. The decision struck down §4(b) of the Act, which dictated a formula that those states 
that engaged in certain types of race-based voter discrimination in the 1960s would be subject to 
preclearance requirements. He did so, he said, because the "extraordinary measures" that 
required the imposition of the Act on those southern states no longer existed, even though, as he 
acknowledged, race-based voting discrimination still exists today. 
Roberts's conclusion could not have been based on fact. The history of the Act up to its 
recent reauthorization showed overwhelming evidence that voting rights still needed protection. 
As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, over two years, the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees held numerous hearings, interviewed witnesses, and received reports showing 
140 Linda Greenhouse, The Real John Roberts Emerges, NY TIMES (June 29, 2013), available at 





countless "examples of flagrant racial discrimination" in covered jurisdictions. 144 The 
Reauthorization passed the House by a vote of 390-to-33; the Senate, 98-to-0. 145 President 
Bush signed the reauthorization a week later, recognizing the need for "further work ... in the 
fight against injustice."146 
In the face of this unified front of coordinate branches, Roberts simply did not see the 
issue of "extraordinary circumstances" in the same light. Instead of accepting Congressional 
and Presidential determinations, he imposed his own value judgment. In the name of 
federalism, he stated, "while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must 
ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions."147 As 
he bluntly put it, "[o]ur country has changed."148 But his authority for such a bold proposition 
cannot be Congress or the Executive branch, given their findings; instead, Roberts is suggesting 
that ·the segregation era, astounding for its overt racism, is dead and therefore the remedial 
measures that came about because of that era cannot be permissible post-burial. 
To realize how dramatically Roberts departed from his ordinary framework, it is helpful 
to compare the decision to another recent Court opinion of great social import. In, United 
States v. Windsor, a woman named Thea Spyer passed away in 2009 in New York. 149 Spyer left 
her entire estate to her partner, a woman named Edith Windsor, to whom Spyer married in a 
lawful ceremony in Ontario a few years earlier. 150 Unlike most opposite sex spouses, however, 
Windsor was unable to claim an estate tax exemption because of a federal law, the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), "which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of 'spouse' as 
144 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
145 /d. 
146 /d. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
147 /d. at 2631 (Roberts, C.J.). 
148 /d. 
149 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) 
150 !d. 
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that term is used in federal statutes."151 The majority, lead by Justice Kennedy, held that 
DOMA was unconstitutional. He wrote, "DOMA violates basic due process and equal 
protection principles ... The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are 
to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex 
marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States."152 
In a short dissent, Roberts stated that he could not find an unconstitutional basis for the 
statute because of the overwhelming congressional and executive support at the time it was 
passed. 153 When DOMA was passed, according to him, it could not have been unconstitutional 
because "[i]nterests in uniformity and stability amply justified Congress's decision to retain the 
definition of marriage that, at that point, had been adopted by every State in our Nation, and 
every nation in the world."154 "At least without some more convincing evidence that the Act's 
principal purpose was to codify malice," he continues, "and that it furthered no legitimate 
government interests, I would not tar the political branches with the brush of bigotry."155 This 
deference stands in stark contrast to his disregard of a comprehensive congressional record in 
Shelby County; and it evidences that the policy-based decision-making Roberts uses in racial 
contexts are stunning, even if cabined to this unique context. 
Part IV: Conclusion. 
At the end of the day, the ultimate question is whether Roberts's "selective minimalism" 
is a good thing, a bad thing, or somewhere in between. Most of his detractors would see this as 
unequivocally bad, and use as evidence his harmful decisions involving race and campaign 
finance. His supports would see the opposite. They would see a common core of values that 
151 !d. 
152 !d. at 2693 
153 !d. at 2696-97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
154 !d. at 2696. 
155 !d. at 2696 (original emphasis). 
31 
Roberts generally applies to his cases, but when such application is not possible, he uses his 
logic and understanding of the world to make the best decision. 
Both answers oversimplify the situation. In one aspect, Roberts's judicial approach is 
unjustifiable-the context of race. His decisions in Shelby County and Parents Involved seem 
to take no consistent approach at all, as Roberts turns his misguided worldview into judge-made 
/ ~ . 
law. But in the other contexts, it is less clear whether his varying applications of restra~ and as t .. _ 
harmful. Indeed, it is somewhat unfair to force upon any person, let alone a justice, a singular 
label or one unitary philosophy. In most contexts, like standing and terrorism or criminal law, 
Roberts has a consistent~f deference and restraint in his opinions. In the First Amendment 
context, Roberts adheres to his approach when he can, but he is inevitably guided to more 
subjective and selective applications when the facts directly run afoul of his moral compass, as 
informed by his background experiences-e.g., student speech and discipline. In conclusion, 
whether one agrees that his approach to minimalism is helpful or harmful, it is undeniable one 
thing-selective. 
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